Introduction
During the past decade few scholars have been seeking to establish viable theoretical connections between diaspora politics and international relations theory.
Reaching to classic IR paradigms, Shain and Barth argued that constructivism can account for the diasporic identities, motives and preferences, and liberalism -for their actions once preferences are settled (2003:451) . Adamson and Demetriou challenged a widely accepted assumption in IR that there is a "fit" between a national and state identity. They proposed that IR treats the concept of "diaspora" as a useful tool to contrast the deterritorialized and network-based collective identities of diasporas with the territorially defined and institutionalized collective identities of states (2007:491) .
A third group focused on the autonomy of diasporas vis-a-vis their original homelands.
Diasporas are seen as either autonomous agents in world politics (Shain 2002) ), or more passively accepting pressures from their original homelands seeking to expand their governance over their identity-based populations abroad (Haegel and Peretz 2005, Ragazzi 2009 ), or acting as both depending on the location of the main mobilizing agents (Shain and Barth 2003 , Koinova 2009 , Lyons and Mandaville 2010 . Most of these authors also acknowledge that diasporas should not be treated as monolithic entities, but the concept needs to be "unpacked" to account for the activities of diasporic individual actors, institutions and networks. The latter is easier said than done in theoretical terms, since major IR theories -and especially realism and liberalism -are not well equipped to account for international relations involving ethno-national diversity on levels different than the "group." Hence, they essentialize diasporas.
This contribution does not aspire to solve this major challenge. It only offers a step further into a better understanding of how the autonomy of agents within 4 diasporas and their positionality in different states and/or international organizations influence the interactions between diasporas and states in international politics. I argue that regardless of how strongly original homelands aspire to govern their populations abroad, powerful diaspora individuals, institutions, and networks enjoy a relative autonomy vis-a-vis their homeland. Their autonomy is a matter of degree, depending on their abilities to extract resources independently of the home-state or networks linked to it, and to maintain legal status in another state that precludes their unwanted return or institutional closure. Apart from their autonomy, their positionality in a given context renders them with specific power vis-a-vis other relevant political actors -such as the majority in a host-state, other powerful lobbies, other segments of the diaspora network, and other relevant international networks.
Positionality is an important, yet little understood concept in diaspora politics.
Autonomy of Diaspora Agency
The The autonomy of diaspora networks is the most questionable and difficult to discern, not least because networks span diaspora circles, homelands, host-lands, international organizations, and other countries' contexts where diasporas reside.
Especially with the advent of Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter information has been spreading instantly throughout networks, and symbols have been evoked for mobilization purposes. Nevertheless, apart from "information" and "symbolic" functions, which networks perform to persuade and socialize, some parts of the network also exercise "leverage" to influence powerful actors, while other parts of the same network are unlikely to do so (Keck and Sikkink 1998:16) . Hence, not all parts of the network are equal in strength nor are they equally exposed to direct intervention from the home-state. Some network segments enjoy greater autonomy.
Albanians' activism for Kosovo independence illustrates this point well. In the early 1990s the non-violent movement of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) created its own branches in the US, Europe, and Australia to internationalize the Kosovars' abuse from the Milosevic regime. These were highly directed networks.
However, the networks of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which advocated armed revolt as of the mid-1990s, were a coalition of several autonomous networks, opposed to LDK's inability to achieve secessionism. At their core was an initially loose network of individual activists with Marxist inclinations based in Switzerland 7 and Germany who advocated armed insurgence already in the early 1980s. The larger KLA network grew by incorporating other autonomous ones after the 1995 Dayton accords failed to deliver a solution for Kosovo and the human rights abuse intensified on the ground. Most notably, the US-based network, which was added to the movement in the mid-1990s, was built of business entrepreneurs who were ideologically opposed to the Marxism of their European counterparts. Finally, in 1998-1999 the KLA managed to convert to their cause major parts of the already existing LDK network.
Positionality in Diaspora Activism
In a recent piece in this journal, Lyons and Mandaville argued that diaspora activists may form a global political movement around shared ideas and goals, but they act alongside logics of "division of labor" within segments of their network.
Each network part has a specific "comparative advantage" over others due to being situated in a specific territory that is prone to engage strategically through either lobbying, fund-raising, or using media (2010:128, 132-133) . The authors touch upon an important phenomenon in diaspora politics, which needs more theoretical elaboration, and which could be well addressed by the concept of "positionality." The term was originally developed in anthropology and sociology to articulate that "gender, class, and other aspects of identities are markers of relational positions rather than essential qualities" (Maher and Tetreault, 1993:118) . I have earlier discussed that in diaspora politics the term "positionality" refers to the relative power that diaspora entrepreneurs perceive as deriving from their social positions occupied in a specific context (Koinova, 2009) . Positionality is both a perceptual and relational category. 
Conclusions
This short essay aimed to demonstrate that emerging theorizing about diasporas and international politics needs to account for the autonomy and positionality of diaspora agency. The agency is not endowed in groups as mainstream IR theorizing would posit, but in powerful diaspora individuals, institutions, and networks, each of which enjoys different degrees of autonomy from the original homeland. Hence, generalizations that diasporas are either non-state actors, or are directed by states who aspire to control their populations abroad need more scrutiny.
Also, each of these actors enjoys certain positionality in a given context, which endows them with power based on the social position they occupy. Positionality needs to be factored into IR theorizing, especially because the discipline needs to advance to better understand the international politics of individuals and networks.
